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1 3. Is the failure to seek prenatal medical care conduct
2 which olaces a fetus in such situation that its person or health
3 is endangered?
4 All three of these issues are questions of first impression;
5 there are no other reported cases in the United States in which
6 a mother has been criminally charged with abuse of an unborn
7 fetus.
8 The California Conference of Methadone Programs entered this
9 case to assist the court as amicus curiae because of its concern
10 that the Court's ruling may affect efforts to encourage addicted
11 pregnant women to seek medical treatment, and may affect the
12 currently available treatment methods. The case is of great
13 significance to all pregnant women, addicted or non-addicted,
14 as well as to all medical professionals who treat them, since the
15 duty of a pregnant woman to her unborn child is presently undefined
16 by the law.
17 The California Conference of Methadone Programs is comprised
18 of sixty-three drug abuse treatment programs in the State of
19 California which are authorized to distribute methadone to over
20 six thousand patients enrolled in these programs. Pursuant to
21 federal regulation. 21 C.F.R. S 310.505, each of these programs is
22 authorized, under carefully prescribed conditions, to administer
23 methadone to pregnant women.
24
25 II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
26 There are two possible theories upon which a charge of
07 child endanqering against defendant Margaret Velasquez Reyes
28 might be based. The first is the allegation of her ingestion of an
2
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1 addictive substance, heroin, with knowledge of its potential
2 harmful effects on her fetus. The second is the allegation of her
3 failure to obtain prenatal medical treatment.
4 According to the court and attorneys for the prosecution and
5 defense, the prosecution against Margaret Reyes is based upon Phe
6 first theory:
7 THE COURT: The accusation here is the use of
8 heroin after allegedly the mother was warned about
9 the nossible danaers in the using of it as far as
10 the unborn child was concerned.
11 MR. RIVAS: That's correct. (Page 51 of the Reporter's
12 Transcript of the Preliminary Hearing in this case.)*
13 THE COURT: I don't think that if the mother had
14 no notice of the Possible effects of what this drug
15 might do, I don't think that would be a violation of
16 the statute. But after notice; then that of course
17 is for me to decide from all the evidence of this case
18 whether there was or was not notice and whether or not
19 the defendant administered herself heroin after that
20 time. (P.H. 53) (Emphasis supplied.)
21 It is also arguable that the charge against Margaret
22 Ielasquez Reyes was based upon the second theory, her alleged
23 omission in failing to seek prenatal medical assistance; in the
24 direct examination of the orosecution's medical expert, Dr. V. G.
25 Muraligopal, the following testimony was elicited:
26
27 * Hereafter references to Reporter's Transcript of the
28 Preliminary Hearing in this case will be designated by P.H.
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1 Q: Does the fact that the defendant did not have
2 prenatal care increase the risk to the children?
3 A: Yes.
4 Q: In--
5 MR. RIVAS! I don't believe he finished
6 his answer.
7 THE WITNESS- I'd like to qualify the
8 answer, if I can. The reason being most of these
9 mothers who abuse heroin have been shown to have a
10 high incidence of infection, especially with venereal
11 disease and also infection with hepatitis because of
12 using drugs. And also toxemia in pregnancy and hyper-
13 tension are known to be shown among drug abusing mothers.
14 Q- So prenatal care can alleviate some of the problems
15 which are created: is that correct?
16 A: Yes. (P.H. 44)
17 In order to permit prosecution on the first theory, the
18 evidence presented at the preliminary hearing must establish
19 probable cause that Margaret Velasquez Reyes was in the third
20 trimester of 1regnancy, and during that period ingested addicting
21 drugs in San Bernardino County with knowledge that this activity
22 would endanger the person or health of each of the two fetuses
23 she was carrying.
24 Defendant Reyes had never verified the fact of her pregnancy
25 with a physician (P.H. 95), although she appeared pregnant to
26 others (P.H. 5), felt herself to be pregnant (P.H. 6, 33-35), and
27 delivered two children on October 31, 1976. There was no
28 evidence that Ms. Reyes was aware at any time prior to delivery
4
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1 that she was carrying twins. Pediatrician Muraligopal testified
2 that on October 31, he examined the children and observed the
3 first child to be a full-term product of a full-term pregnancy and,
4 the second, small and undergrown. Both appeared normal. (P.R. 41)
5 Within twenty-four hours, the physician observed that the children
6 were "jittery" (P.H. 41) and determined that the 9maller child was
7 experiencing hypocalcemia, a low level of serum calcium. (P.H. 42).
8 Despite the allegation of the orosecutor that no specific harm
9 need befall the child for the parent to be charged with child
10 endangering, testimony was elicited regarding the medical condition
31 of Ms. Reves' newborns% large feedings at frequent intervals,
12 nasal stuffiness, jitteriness, irritability, and crying (P.H. 58),
13 a "mild form of withdrawal" (P.R. 60-61). The first child was
14 treated for the effects of his withdrawal for about a month; the
15 second, weaker boy continued to receive medical treatment with the
16 drug thorazine through the date of Preliminary Hearing in
17 January, 1977. (P.H. 88).
18 Several indications that the defendant took heroin during her
19 pregnancy were elicited at the Preliminary Hearing. Deputy Sheriff
20 Jill Webster of the Child Abuse Unit of the Juvenile Division
21 stated that the defendant told her that she took heroin during her
22 pregnancy (P.H. 94) That statement failed to reveal when during
23 her pregnancy M4s. Reyes ingested heroin, that is, whether or not it
24 took place during the months of September and/or October, 1976.
25 Nor did that statement reveal where the heroin ingestion took
26 place, that is, whether or not it took olace in San Bernardino
27 County or the State of California. Finally, fWebster's testimony
28 failed to show that Reyes' heroin ingestion took place after notic
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1 of the possible adverse consequences for the child.
2 The second indication that Margaret Reyes took heroin during
3 her pregnancy came from pediatrician Muraligooal. He testified
4 that he instructed Dr. Bangasser to confront the defendant regard-
5 ing opiate usage (P.H. 59), that he had no personal knowledge from
6 the defendant that she used heroin during her pregnancy (P.H. 60)
7 but that Ms. Reves had told Bangassar that she had used heroin
8 during her pregnancy (P.H. 42). Again, the court was not provided
9 with information as to when or where such ingestion occurred, nor
10 whether it happened after notice of its potentially harmful effects
1. on her unborn child.
12 The final indication of defendant's possible use of heroin was
13 offered by Public Health Nurse Cooke's testimony that she
14 observed needle marks on both of defendant's arms. (P.H. 11). It
15 is unclear when these observations were made, although it would
16 appear to be in September, 1976. No testimony was elicited about
17 the staleness or freshness of these marks. Finally, the Public
18 Health Nurse, who had no professional experience with heroin-
19 addicted mothers (P.H. 30), no prior working experience with long-
20 term aadicts (P.H. 23), no previous contact with this defendant
21 (P.H. 22) and whose sole experience in detecting addicted
22 persons was some discussion in nursing courses (P.H. 17), offered
23 the opinion that Ms. Reyes was under the influence of heroin
24 during contacts with her. (P.H. 22, 23, 28).
25 The Court below correctly ruled that the prosecution could
26 not succeed without showing that the defendant was on notice of
27 the potential harm to the fetus prior to her ingestion of heroin.
28 The evidence of such notice offered at the preliminary hearing
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1 consisted of the testimony of Public Health Nurse Cooke that she
2 advised defendant that if she "was or has or is on heroin it
3 would affect the baby and that was a high risk" (P.H. 6) and that
4 it could be born addicted and suffering withdrawals and/or that
5 it could be stillborn. (P.H. 7).
t6 In addition, Deputy Sheriff Webster testified that, after the
7 babies were born, the defendant told her she knew what could happen
8 to the kids and that she nodded her head to knowing they could die
9 from withdrawal symptoms. (P.H. 95).
10 It is implicit in the "notice" element that the State demon-
11 strate Margaret Velasquez Reyes knew of the pr6dictable risks and
12 thereafter decided to continue ingesting heroin. There is no
13 factual showing that the defendant ingested heroin after she was
.14 advised of the potential hazards.
15 In order to permit prosecution on the second theory, the
16 evidence presented at the preliminary hearing must establish
17 orobable cause that Margaret Velasquez Reyes, during the third
18 trimester of pregnancy, willfully refused to seek medical treatment,
19 knowing such refusal would endanger the person or health of each of
20 the two fetuses she was carrying.
21 Testimony was elicited through Ms. Cooke, the Public Health
22 Nurse, that the defendant knew she was pregnant, had been
23 pregnant previously, that she was Rh negative, had been advised
24 against future pregnancies by a physician, and had been a heroin
25 addict. (P.H. 6). Ms. Cooke revealed that she had repeatedly
26 stressed the importance of Reyes' getting antepartum attention.
27 (P.H. 8). Defendant's sister had advised her repeatedly to go for
28 medical aid. (P.H. 33).
HeinOnline  -- 6 Contemp. Drug Probs. 204 1977
205
1 Dr. Muraligopal testified that the absence of prenatal
2 care increased the risk to the babies. (P.H.44 ). There is
3 no requirement under the law that a pregnant woman seek or get
4 prenatal care. The Public Health Nurse testified that there is
5 no way she could compel a woman to obtain antepartum treatment.
6 (P.H. 15, 27)., further Deputy Sheriff Jill Webster testified
7 the defendant acknowledged she had not gone to a physician during
8 her term of pregnancy. (P.H. 95).
9 The prosecution failed to produce evidence to establish
10 that the defendant did not receive any prenatal attention.
11 The only testimony addressing this issue indicated that the
12 defendant did not receive prenatal attention from a physician.
13 However, on at least one occasion, it was shown Ms. Reyes sought
14 medical advice from Public Health Nurse Cooke, and visited the
15 clinic for treatment. (P.H. 10-11). No evidence was offered
16 as to the availability of methadone maintenance treatment in
17 the locale. Apparently, defendant was never advised that medi7
18 cal treatment could be procured that would not necessitate her
19 experiencing withdrawal.
20 Apart from an ambiguous reference by Public Health Nurse
21 Cooke that "it was a case for confidentiality" (P.H. 8), it
22 does not appear that Ms. Reyes was ever advised concerning the
23 risks of admitting her use of heroin in seeking medical treat-
24 ment. Certainly, none of her statements to Nurse Cooke was
25 held in confidence.
26 /1
27 //
28 /I
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1 III. IT IS ACCEPTED MEDICAL PRACTICE TO TREAT ADDICTED
MOTHERS WITH METHADONE, ALTHOUGH WITHDRAWAL OF
2 THE INFANT FROM METHADONE MAY OCCUR AFTER BIRTH.
3 Although Respondent urges the Court to ignore reference
4 to articles not offered in evidence at the Preliminary Hearing
5 (Return to Alternative Writ of Mandate, p. 18), the following
6 summary is offered in conformity with the advice offered to
7 appellate judges by Bernard E. Witkin:
8 "Where policy is a determinative factor, and
scientific . . . background is necessary for an un-
9 derstanding of the issues, courts freely seek aid
from encyclopedias, works on science, economics, or
10 sociology, and sometimes newspaper or magazine re-
ports of current events." Witkin, Manual on Appel-
11 late Court Ooinions, 572, p. 119 (1977).
12 Moreover, it will be seen that the testimony of the
13 attending physician elicited at the preliminary hearing in
14 this case is consistent with the medical literature. To avoid
15 lengthy and repetitious citations, references will be made by
16 number to the medical literature listed in the Index to this
17 brief.
18 While this is the first reported case in the United
19 States in which a mother giving birth to an addicted infant
20 has been charged with criminal child abuse, such births are
21 not a rare phenomenon. In 1972, one in every 16 infants born
22 at Philadelphia General Hospital was born to a drug-dependent
23 mother. (1) At the New York Center for Comprehensive Health
24 Practice in East Harlem, one in every 29 births was reported
25 for 1974. (2) The attending physician in this case reported
26 experience in treating as many as 40 addicted infants. (P.H. 4(b).
27 While the effects of a mother's drug ingestion upon the
28 fetus has been the subject of substantial medical research in
9
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l recent years, many questions remain unanswered. Before sum-
2 marizing this research, however, a word of caution is appro-
3 priate. Many of the obstetrical and medical complications
4 accompanying the birth of addicted infants are attributable to
5 the mother's low standard of health care, rather than simply
6 the ingestion of drugs. Seventy-five percent of addicted preg-
7 nant women never see a physician during their pregnancies. (1)
8 Where a program of comprehensive health care is provided,
9 dramatic improvements in neonatal health have been reported.
10 The incidence of low birthweight was reduced from 48% to 24%,
11 severe withdrawal in the infant was reduced from 41% to 6%, and
12 the frequency of other neonatal problems declined from 41% to
13 24% in one well documented study of the effect of comprehensive
14 clare of the pregnant addict. (3) It appears that if women
15 using heroin received all the prenatal care and special services
16 offered to the women in methadone maintenance programs, they
17 would have larger, healthier babies. (4)
18 Methadone is a synthetic opiate utilized to prevent with-
19 drawal and euphoria in those addicted to opiates. It is le-
20 gally administered to 72,000 ex-heroin addicts in the United
21 States at more than 400 Centers. (13) Twenty-five percent of
22 these patients are estimated to be women of child bearing age.
23 (8) The goal of methadone maintenance treatment is summarized
24 in the federal Methadone Treatment Manual as "the complete
25 physical, psychological, social and economic rehabilitation of
26 each patient in the program." (13) Methadone is normally dis-
27 pensed on a daily basis at a clinic staffed by a physician,
28 nurses, social workers and other supporting personnel.
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1 Virtually all drugs ingested by a pregnant woman may
2 have some effect on the fetus she is carrying. The number of
3 drugs taken by pregnant women has increased so dramatically
4 in recent years that "the fetus is potentially at greater risk
5 from well-intentioned medicaments than from the vicissitudes of
6 pregnancy and delivery." (5) Because heroin, methadone and
7 other narcotic drugs have low molecular weight, they cross the
8 placental barrier and appear in the fetal blood and tissues
9 within an hour, regardless of how they are ingested. (1) As a
10 result of repeated ingestion, the fetus becomes addicted in
11 utero, and if the mother experiences withdrawal from a narcotic
12 drug, the fetus will experience withdrawal in utero. With-
13 drawal of the mother is not recommended during the third tri-
14 mester, because fetal distress may result in premature delivery,
15 (6) or even fetal demise. (P.H. 45). Frequently, the addicted
16 mother is not even aware of her pregnancy until late in the
17 second trimester, since heroin and methadone both interfere
18 with regular ovulation and menstruation. (4) Thus, the treat-
19 ment of choice recommended by most physicians, including the
20 attending physician in this case (P.H. 81), and endorsed by
21 the American Medical Association (7) is low-dose methadone
22 maintenance of the mother. It is expected that infants born
23 to mothers maintained on methadone will also be dependent on
24 methadone and undergo withdrawal after birth. Administration
25 of methadone during pregnancy, therefore, is not to prevent
26 withdrawal in the infant, but to decrease the incidence of
27 other complications occuring during illicit heroin use. (8)
28 /1
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. Methadone maintenance for pregnant addicts has also re-
2 ceived the cautious approval of the federal agencies charged
3 with supervision of methadone programs. Regulations adopted
4 by the Food.and Drug Administration of the Department of Health,
5 Education and Welfare recommend dosage levels be maintained as
6 low as possible, and require the female patient be "fully in-
7 formed concerning the possible risks to a pregnant woman or
8 her unborn child from the use of methadone." 21 C.F.R. 130.44
9 (6) (c) (2); 37 Fed. Reg. No. 242, p. 26798 (December 15, 1972).
10 In compliance with this regulation, the government consent form
12 signed by all female patients of child bearing age contains the
12 following warning:
13 "Besides the possible risks involved with the
lona-term use of methadone, I further understand
14 that, like heroin and other narcotic drugs, infor-
mation on its effects on pregnant women and on their
15 unborn children is at present inadequate to guarantee
that it may not produce significant or serious side
16 effects.
17 It has been explained to me and I understand
that methadone is transmitted to the unborn child
18 and will cause physical dependence. Thus, if I am
pregnant and suddenly stop taking methadone, I or
19 the unborn child may show signs of withdrawal which
may adversely affect my pregnancy or the child. I
20 shall use no other drugs without the Medical Director
or his assistants' approval, since these drugs, par-
21 ticularly as they might interact with methadone, may
harm me or my unborn child. I shall inform any
22 other doctor who sees me during my present or any
future pregnancy or who sees the child after birth,
23 of my current or past participation in a methadone
treatment program in order that he may properly care
24 for my child and me.
25 It has been explained to me that after the birth
of my child I should not nurse the baby because
26 methadone is transmitted through the milk to the
baby and this may cause physical dependence on metha-
27 done in the child. I understand that for a brief
period following birth, the child may show temporary
28 irritability or other ill effects due to my use of
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1 methadone. It is essential for the child's physi-
cian to know of my participation in a methadone
2 treatment program so that he may provide appropriate
medical treatment for the child.
3
All the above possible effects of methadone
4 have been fully explained to me and I understand
that at present, there have not been enough studies
5 conducted on the long term use of the drug to assure
complete safety to my child. With full knowledge of
6 this, I consent to its use and promise to inform the
Medical Director or one of his assistants immediately
7 if I become pregnant in the future." Form FD 2635
(12/72), Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
8 Public Health Service, Food and Drug Administration.
9
10 The infant withdrawal syndrome may vary significantly,
11 depending upon the duration and type of maternal addiction and
12 the mother's drug level just prior to giving birth. Nearly
13 one-third of infants born to drug dependent mothers show no
14 symptoms of withdrawal. The attending physician in this case
15 reported observing no infant withdrawal even where mothers
16 took heroin up to two hours prior to delivery. (P.H. 63, 71).
17 One observer reports severe withdrawal may occur in the infant
18 whose mother has taken large amounts of drugs for a long time,
19 (1) while other observers find no correlation between maternal
20 dose and presence of withdrawal, claiming infants whose mothers
21 were maintained on 200 mg of methadone per day experienced
22 withdrawal while some of those whose mothers were maintained
23 on higher doses remained symptom free. (8)
24 As between heroin and methadone, conflicting reports have
25 been published, two claiming withdrawal is less severe in in-
26 fants addicted to methadone, (9, 10) while one study reported
27 a higher incidence and more prolonged duration of withdrawal
28 symptoms among methadone addicted infants than among those
13
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1 addicted to heroin (11). The attending physician in this case
2 reported the effects of withdrawal from heroin and methadone
3 were "similar." (P.H. 49-50)
4 Most addicted infants, whether born to heroin or metha-
5 done mothers, appear physically and behaviorally normal at
6 birth. Clinical signs of withdrawal, such as tremors, rest-
7 lessness, hyperactive reflexes and regurgitation, appear
8 between 4 and 24 hours of age if the mother has been on heroin
9 alone. These symptoms may not appear until the end of the
10 first day, or as much as a week after birth, where the mother
11 has been on methadone alone. Depending on severity, the 4ur-
12 ation of symptoms is anywhere from 6 days to 8 weeks. (1)
13 Treatment of withdrawal symptoms in newborn infants
141 includes swaddling and careful feeding. (4) Phenobarbital is
151 especially effective in controlling irritability (1) and in
16 one recent study of 118 addicted infants, satisfactory effects
171, were obtained with phenobarbital in all but four children. In
18 those four, paregoric was administered with subsequent relief.
19 (1) Duration of this medication varies, according to severity
20 of withdrawal symptoms, from 5 days to 2 months. (1)
21 After treatment of withdrawal symptoms, the prognosis
22 for normal growth and development of the infant is excellent.
23 of 31 infants born to patients in one New York methadone pro-
24 gram, all have done well following discharge from the hospital,
25 with no abnormalities in growth noted. (8) Similar results
26 have been reported elsewhere. (12) The attending physician in
27i this case reported observing no cases of fetal death, infant
28 mortality, or brain damage resulting solely from a mother's
14
HeinOnline  -- 6 Contemp. Drug Probs. 211 1977
212 REYES V. CALIFORNIA
1 heroin usage. (P.H. 68-69, 79).
2
3 IV. PENAL CODE S273a DOES NOT PERMIT PROSECUTION
OF A MOTHER FOR ABUSE OF CHILDREN PRIOR TO
4 BIRTH.
5 The purpose of Penal Code S273a was to protect children
6 after their birth. This purpose clearly emerges when 5273a
7 is read in pari materia with Penal Code Sections 270 and 275.
8 The scope of the requirement that statutes in pari materia be
9 construed together was neatly summarized in Old Homestead
10 Bakery v. Marsh, 75 Cal. App. 247, 258, 242 P. 749 (1925):
11 "Statutes in pari materia are those which
relate to the same person -or thing, or to the same
12 class of persons or things. In the construction
or a particular statute, or in the interpretation
13 of any of its provisions, all acts relating to the
same subject, or having the same general purpose,
14 should be read in connection with it, as together
constituting one law. The endeavor should be made,
15 by tracing the history of legislation on the sub-
ject, to ascertain the uniform and consistent -
16 pose of the legislature, or to discover how theu
r
policy of the legislature with reference to the
17 subject matter has been changed or modified from
time to time. With this purpose in view therefore
18 it is proper to consider, not only acts passed at
the same session of the legislature, but also acts
19 passed at prior and subsequent sessions, and even
those which have been repealed." Accord, Isobe v.
20 Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 12 Cal. 3d 584, 590,
116 Cal. Rptr. 376, 526 P.2d 528 (1974).21
Penal Code §273a, as first enacted in 1905 provided:22
"Any person who willfully causes or permits
23 any child to suffer, or who inflicts thereon un-
-justifiable physical pain or mental suffering, and
24 whoever, having the care or custody of any child,
causes or permits the life or limb of such child
25 to be endangered, or the health of such child to
be injured, and any person who willfully causes or
26 permits such child to be placed in such situation
that its life or limb may be endangered, or its
27 health likely to be injured, is guildy of a mis-
demeanor." Stats., 1905, C.568, p. 759, §5.
28.1
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1 Prior to the 1905 enactment of S273a, the only statu-
2 tory protection of children contained in the Penal Code was
3 §270, enacted in 1872 to provide as follows-
4 "Every parent of any child who willfully omits,
without lawful excuse, to perform any duty imposed
5 upon him by law, to furnish necessary food, clothing,
shelter, or medical attention for such child is
6 guilty of a misdemeanor."
7 Significantly, the same 1905 act which added 5273a to the
8 Penal Code amended §270, and the act was entitled "An act to
9 amend section[s] two hundred and seventy . . . and to add new
10 sections thereto to be numbered .. .. two hundred and seventy
11 three a . . . , all relatina to crimes against children."
12 (Emphasis added). Thus, it is clear the legislature intended
13 "child" to have the same meaning in both sections 270 and 273a.
14 Stats., 1905, C.568, p. 758, 91.
15 In 1925, the legislature amended Penal Code §270, adding
16 the provision that "A child conceived but not yet born is to
17 be deemed an existing person insofar as this section is con-
18 cerned." Stats., 1925, C.325, p. 544, S1. In construing this
19 amendment to uphold the conviction of a defendant for failure
20 to support an unborn child, the Court in People v. Yates, 114
21 Cal. App. Supp. 782, 785, 298 P. 961 (1931) noted, "Until the
22 addition was made, the section had no application to an un-
23 born child." Accord, People v. Sianes, 134 Cal. App. 355, 25
24 P.2d 4S7 (1933). Thus, the failure to amend 5273a to similar-
25 ly extend its application to unborn children is strongly in-
26 dicative of legislative intent to exclude unborn children from
27 its operation. As recently noted by the Supreme Court in a
28 closely related context,
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1 "[W]hen the Legislature determines to confer
legal personality on unborn fetuses for certain
2 limited purpose, it expresses that intent in spe-
cific and appropriate terms; . . . [Wie may fairly
3 infer that if at any time during the ensuing cen-
tury the Legislature had meant to include fetuses
4 among the class of victims described . . it could
easily have so provided by amending the statute in
5 either of the ways in which, as we have seen, it
amended Penal Code sections 187 and 270 for the
6 very same purpose. We decline to promulgate such
an amendment ourselves." Justus v. Atchison, 19
7 Cal. 3d 564, 579, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
8 Still further support can be found by comparing Penal
9 Code §273a with the abortion prohibition contained in Penal
10 Code §275. In 1963, 5273a was amended to increase the penalty
11 to up to ten years in the state prison for abuse of a child
12 "under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great
13 bodily harm or death." Stats., 1963, C.783, p. 1811, Sl. At
14 the same time, §275 provided a penalty of upto five years in
15 the state prison for a woman who submits to an unlawful abor-
16 tion. If g273a is given the, interpretation urged by the re-
17 spondent, it would mean the legislature intended the killing
18 of a fetus by the mother to be a less serious crime than en-
19 dangering its health. Nor is this anomalous result affected
20 by recent changes in the law. The 1970 amendment to Penal
21 Code §187, defining murder to include the unlawful killing of
22 a fetus, specifically exempts a killing which was consented to
23 by the mother. Stats., 1970, C.1311, p. 2440, §l. The Uni-
24 form Determinate Sentencing Act provides a maximum penalty of
25 3 years for both Sections 273a and 275. Stats., 1976, C.1139,
26 §5165, 168. Thus, even today, an addicted mother would face
27 no greater penalty for unlawfully aborting her pregnancy in
28 the third trimester than she faces by giving birth to a child
17
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1 who subsequently experiences withdrawal. If the legislature
2 had intended 5273a to provide protection for health of the
3 unborn, it would surely have provided a lesser penalty than
4 provided for killing the unborn!
5 The Respondent's suggestion that delaying prosecution
6 until the child is born somehow distinguishes this case from
7 a prosecution for abuse of a fetus misses the point. The
8 statute prohibits causing or permitting a child to be placed
9 in such a situation that its (the child's) person or health is
10 endangered. The only reason the children in this case exper-
11 ienced withdrawal is because they were addicted as fetuses.
12 Thus, at the time they were "placed" in a situation that en-
13 dangered their health, they were not "children" within the
14 meaning of the statute.
15
16 V. IF PENAL CODE 1273a WERE EXPANDED TO REQUIRE
PRENATAL CARE FOR A FETUS, THE STATUTE WOULD
171 BE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE.
is Although this issue has been briefed by the Petitioner
19 and the Respondent, the full implications of expanding the
20 scope of Penal Code §273a to include prenatal care of fetuses
21 requires further explication in light of recent medical re-
22 search.
23 Adoption of the interpretation of 5273a urged by the
24 Respondent would render the causing or permitting a fetus to
25 be placed in such situation that its person or health is
26 "likely to be injured" a crime. Medical science has only re-
27 cently revealed the extent to which the health of a fetus may
28 be adversely affected by the habits of its mother. To offer
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1 just a few examples:
2 A. Alcohol. The "fetal alcohol syndrome" has been
3 identified as the third most common birth defect in
4 the United States. The ingestion of alcohol during
5 pregnancy has been linked to stunted growth of the
6 fetus, cardiac anomalies, and mental retardation
7 (I.Q. 79 or below). These features are found in
8 about one-half of the infants born to severely alco-
9 holic mothers. Corrigan, "The Fetal Alcohol Syndrome,"
10 72 Texas Medicine 72 (January, 1976). These findings
il led the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Al-
12 coholism to issue a "Health Warning" advising preg-
13 nant women that more than two drinks per day increases
14 the risk of giving birth to a deformed or mentally
15 retarded baby. NIAAA estimated that about 5% of all
16 women fall into the high risk "heavry drinker" cate-
17 gory. 1 U.S. Journal of Drug and Alcohol Dependence,
1s No. 6, p. 1 (July, 1977).
19 B. Smoking. The evidence is overwhelming that the new-
20 born infants of mothers who smoke cigarettes during
21 pregnancy are smaller and more liable to die than
22 those of comparable mothers who do not smoke. Ap-
23 parently, this phenomenon is related to the high
24 level of carbon monoxide in the blood of smoking
25 mothers, which readily traverses the placenta.
26 Hyffen, "Smoking in Pregnancy," 15 Develop. Med.
27 Child Neurol. 355 (1973). Approximately 50% of all
28 pregnant women smoke. Schenkel & Vorherr, "Non-
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1 Prescription Drugs During Pregnancy: Potential
2 Teratogenic and Toxic Effects Upon Embryo and Fetus,"
3 12 Journal of Reproductive Medicine 27 (January, 1974).
4 C. Non-Prescription Drugs. It has been reported that
5 non-prescription drugs available over the counter
6 may cause extensive damage in the unborn baby. AS-
7 pirin has been linked to damage to the nervous system,
8 kidneys, liver, and bleeding tendency; antihistamines,
9 barbiturates and cold and cough medicines may cause
10 skeletal malformations, liver and brain damage; and
fl antacid and laxative use are related to kidney and
12 brain damage. It is estimated that 65% of pregnant
13 women use aspirin and antacids, and 60% take three
14 or more drugs simultaneously. Schenkel & Vorherr,
15 supra.
16 These examples are only the tip of the iceberg which
17 would be created by the interpretation of §273a urged by the
18 respondent. Not only would the pregnant mother who insists
19 upon smoking or drinking be subject to criminal prosecution,
20 but the prospective mother who disregards her doctor's in-
21 structions to drink more milk would also come within the terms
22 of the statute. In People v McCaughen, 49 Cal. 2d 409, 414,
23 317 P.2d 974 (1957), Justice Traynor spoke for the Cogrt,
24 citing Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391,
25 46 S. Ct. 126 (1926): "[A] statute which either forbids or re-
26 quires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of com-
27 mon intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning apd
28 differ as to its application violates the first essential of
20
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1 due process of law." It is equally offensive that women of
2 common intelligence will be left to guess at the meaning of
3 the law. Nor is it any answer to this argument that we can
4 rely upon the good sense of prosecutors to invoke the statute
5 in only aggravated circumstances. As noted by Justice Frank-
6 furter in his concurring opinion in Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
7 U.S. 270, 285 (1951):
8 "The.vice to be guarded against is arbitrary
action by'officials. The fact that in a particular
9 instance an action appears not arbitrary does not
save the validity of the authority under which the
10 action was taken."
11 More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court identified the evil of
12 vague laws in the following terms:
13 "A vague law impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for
14 resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with
the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discrimina-
15 tory application." Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 109 (1971). See also Smith v. Goquen,
16 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974).
17 If the law is to impose a standard of prenatal care to
1s be enforced by criminal sanctions against pregnant mothers,
19 such a step should be accompanied by carefully circumscribed
20 definitions, rather than the vague concept that the health of
21 the fetus is "likely to be injured," leaving prosecutors free
22 to apply this prohibition on an ad hoc and subjective basis.
23 The task of formulating such definitions is more appropriately
24 left to the legislature, which can invite expert commentary
25 from those most likely to be affected by such legislation.
26 Even as presently interpreted Section 273a approaches
27 the outer limits of permissible vagueness and overbreadth.
23 While upholding the statute, the Court in People v. Beaugez,
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1 232 Cal. App. 2d 650, 656-658 (1965) noted:
2 "The type of conduct which this portion of the
statute seeks to reach defies precise definition.
3 In number and kind the situations where a child's
life or health may be imperiled are infinite. Yet
4 the aim of the statute is not obscure and its ob-
jective is a salutary social one. It seeks to pro-
5 tect children from willful mistreatment whether
directly or indirectly applied . . . by applying the
6 'rule of reason' to the whole provision, we construe
its meaning as a whole to condemn the intentional
7 placing of a child, or permitting him to be placed,
in a situation in which serious physical danger or
8 health hazard to the child is reasonably foreseeable.
This is the construction of intent which the context
9 of the statute as a whole justifies, and so construct-
ed we find it not void for vagueness."
10
The "rule of reason" approach adopted in Beaugez would
11
offer little assistance if the statute were interpreted to
12
include a fetus. The danger to a fetus may be subject to a
13
wide spectrum both in the degree of harm which may result and
14
the degree of risk that the particular activity will produce
15
the harm. For example, if six drinks a day creates a 40%
16
probability that a child will be born retarded, while four
17
drinks a day reduces the probability to 20%, and the mother
18
is fully aware of these risks, how do we apply a "rule of
19
reason" to say one mother is a child abuser and the other is
20
not? What if it is shown three drinks a day may reduce the
21
child's I.Q. 10% while six drinks a day reduces it 30%?
22
23
VI. IF PENAL CODE §273a WERE EXPANDED TO FORBID
24 THE INGESTION OF ADDICTING DRUGS DURING PREG-
NANCY, THE STATUTE WOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
25
If the Court adopts the interpretation of Penal Code
26
9273a urged by the respondent, to forbid the ingestion of
27
addicting drugs during pregnancy as conduct which endangers
28
22
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1 the health of a child, a whole host of constitutional diffi-
2 culties looms on the horizon. The statute would create ir-
3 rational classifications, recuire compulsory self-incrimina-
4 tion, impose cruel and unusual punishment, and be pre-empted
5 by federal law. The Court must presume that the Legislature
6 intended to enact a valid statute. Thus, in applying the
7 provision, the Court must "adopt an interpretation that, con-
8 sistent with the statutory language and purpose, eliminates
9 doubts as to the provision's constitutionality." In 2e Kay,
10 1 Cal. 3d 930, 942, 83 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1970); People v. Amor,
1 12 Cal. 3d 20, 30, 114 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
12 A. If Penal Code §273a is interpreted to forbid the
13 ingestion of heroin during pregnancy, while per-
14 mitting the ingestion of other harmful substances,
15 the statute would create irrational classifications
16 violating the guarantee of equal protection of the
171 law.
18 Apart from the withdrawal syndrome, no other risk to
19 infant health was shown by the evidence presented at the
20 preliminary hearing, nor is it likely that any other risk
21 could be shown. The reason this is significant is that the
22 risk of the infant going through withdrawal is equally great
23 when the mother is maintained on methadone, which is the course
24 of treatment generally recommended by medical experts. If
25 risking withdrawal is placing a fetus "in such situation that
26 its person or health is endangered," there would seem to be no
27 rational basis to distinguish heroin from other addictive drugs.
28i While the mother addicted to heroin can be distinguished from
23
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1 the mother being treated with methadone by the absence of
2 medical supervision, this is a factor which transcends the
3 ingestion of addicting substances. The absence of prenatal
4 medical care always creates greater risks for the unborn
5 child, whether the mother is addicted or not. If it is the
6 absence of prenatal medical care which is seen as the act
7 which endangers the health of the fetus, there is no rational
8 basis to distinguish the addict mother from the diabetic
9 mother in terms of the risk to their unborn children.
10 The infant withdrawal syndrome is not unique to narcotic
12 drugs. Barbiturates, whether prescribed as medication or not,
12 also have addictive potential, cross the placenta, and addict
13 the fetus. Withdrawal symptoms similar in every respect to
14 heroin withdrawal have been observed in newborn infants born
15 to mothers who ingested barbiturates during their pregnancy.
16 Desmond, Schwanecke, Wilson, Yasunaga & Burgdorff, "Maternal
17 Barbiturate Utilization and Neonatal Withdrawal Symptomatology,
181 80 Journal of Pediatrics 190 (February, 1972).
191 When one compares the short-term effects of heroin with-
20 drawal to the permanent birth defects related to the excessive
21 use of alcohol, one is hard put to even come up with a rational
22 basis to distinguish heroin from alcohol in terms of the risks
23 to fetal health presented by their ingestion during pregnancy.
24 The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
25 laws has been judicially defined to mean "that no person or
26 class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the
27 laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in
28 like circumstances in their lives, liberty and property and in
24
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1 their pursuit of happiness." Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App.
2 3d 1, 21, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1971). Where a legislative
3 classification impinges upon a fundamental right, the burden
4 is upon the state to show a compelling interest to justify
5 the classification. The right to procreate and the right to
6 privacy are fundamental rights that call for especially close
7 scrutiny of the state interest which justifies their abridg-
8 ment. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942);
9 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); Griswold v.
10 Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965). An interpre-
11 tation of S273a to prohibit the ingestion of heroin by a preg-
12 nant mother, while allowing the ingestion 'of other substances
13 such as methadone and barbiturates, which also have a potential
14 for infant withdrawal, could not withstand the "particular
15 careful scrutiny" that the equal protection clause demands.
16 Nor could any prohibition of any addicting drug be justified
17 if the ingestion of alcohol were exempted, since alcohol creates
18 greater risks of permanent injury to the fetus.
19 Thus, the vagueness limitation of due process, and the
20 rational classification requirement of the equal protection clausE
21 emerge as a double edged sword to pierce the construction of
22 5273a urged by the respondent: if ingestion of all harmful
23 substances during pregnancy is proscribed, the prohibition
24 would be vague and overbroad; if the prohibition is limited to
25 heroin, or even to addicting drugs, the statute runs afoul of
26 the equal protection clause. The obvious route out of this
27 thicket is legislation which is carefully drafted to distin-
28 guish the risks presented by various categories of behavior,
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1 with the severity of sanctions imposed being varied accord-
2 ingly.
3 B. If Penal Code §273a is interpreted to forbid the
4 ingestion of addicting drugs during pregnancy, the
5 companion provision of Penal Code §llll.5 would
6 require compulsory self-incrimination.
7 If the ingestion of addicting drugs during pregnancy is
8 held to place a child in such situation that its person or
9 health is endangered, then every addicted mother who seeks
10 medical help may come within the provisions of Penal Code
11 11161.5, which require physicians, nurses, social workers and
12 others to report "any injury prohibited by the terms of Section
13 273a" to the local police authority and the juvenilelprobation
14 department, or to the county welfare or health department. As
15 a practical matter, this could discourage addicted mothers
16 from seeking medical help, which is the worst thing the law
17 could do. As a constitutional matter, this would compel the-
16 addicted mother to incriminate herself, in violation of the
19 Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
20 tion and Article I, Section 13 of the California Constitution.
21 While the reporting requirement of §11161.5 does not
22 ordinarily compel self-incrimination, since the doctor, nurse
23 or social worker is simply reporting what he or she observed
24 based upon contact with the child who was a victim of abuse,
25 if §273a is extended to include a fetus, the information being
26 reported will come directly from examination of and discussion
27 with the mother. By providing this information, the mother
28 will subject herself to substantial hazards of self-incrimination,
26
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1 since there is a real risk of prosecution as a child abuser.
2 Where disclosures are extracted from a "highly selective group
3 inherently suspect of criminal activities," and the risk of
4 criminal prosecution is a real one, reporting procedures have
5 been held to violate the privilege against self-incrimination.
6 Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70, 78-79, 86 S. Ct. 194 (1965);
7 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48, 57, 88 S. Ct. 697
8 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 96-99, 88 S. Ct.
9 722 (1968). Narcotics addicts are certainly "inherently sus-
10 pect of criminal activities."
11 In Blinder v. Division of Narcotic Enforcement, 25 Cal.
12 App. 3d 174, 101 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1972), the Court upheld the
13 requirement of Health & Safety Code 511395 (now 511221) that a
14 physician report the prescribing of a narcotic to an addict
15 to the Attorney General. In rejecting the self-incrimination
16 argument of the addict plaintiffs, the Court said:
17 "The sections of the statutory scheme attacked
do not impose any direct reporting requirement upon
1 addict plaintiffs. However, it is evident that the
addict must inform the physician of his addiction
19 and that the physician's subsequent report will
identify the patient as an addict. However, nar-
20 cotic addiction is not a crime and no one may be
punished simply because he is a narcotic addict
21 . . . Any risk of prosecution is necessarily a
'remote possibility out of the ordinary course of
22 law.'" 25 Cal. App. 3d 188.
23 The Blinder reasoning is readily distinguishable from
24 this case. Here, the risk of incrimination to the mother is
25 not her exposure as an addict, but her exposure as a "child
26 abuser." If this case serves as an example of how prosecu-
27 torial discretion is exercised, the "risk of prosecution" if
28 the addict mother is reported as a "child abuser" is certainly
27
HeinOnline  -- 6 Contemp. Drug Probs. 224 1977
1 more than a "remote possibility."
2 C. If Penal Code 5273a is interpreted to forbid
3 the ingestion of addicting drugs during preg-
4 nancy, the statute will violate the constitu-
5 tional prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
6 ment.
7 In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667, 82 S. Ct.
8 1417 (1962), the United States Supreme Court held:
9 "That a state law which imprisons a person thus
affected as a criminal, even though he has never
10 touched any narcotic drug within the State or been
guilty of any irregular behavior there inflicts a
11 cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
12
The Respondent's attempt to dismiss the applicability of13
this precedent is too simplistic. It is suggested that Robin-
14
son is inapplicable because the offensive conduct involved here
15
is the use of narcotics, rather than the status of being an
16
addict. The speciousness of this distinction is immediately
17
apparent when we explore the options available to a female18
addict.who discovers she is pregnant. Essentially, she has19
two choices, assuming she has decided against abortion:20
continue to use, or go through withdrawal. Both of these
21
choices present risks to the fetus. If she continues to use,
22
her baby will be born addicted and experience withdrawal after23
birth. If she goes through withdrawal, the fetus will exper-
24
ience withdrawal in utero, and the fetal distress may precipi-
25
tate a premature delivery with all of the concomitant risks
26
that represents. Thus, it is clear that it is the mother's
27
status as an addict that creates the danger to the health of28
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1 the fetus, and she may face the risk of punishment whether
2 she continues to use or not.
3 D. If Penal Code §273a is interpreted to forbid the
4 ingestion of all addicting drugs during pregnancy,
5 the statute will be pre-empted by federal laws.
6 Federal regulations currently permit the use of metha-
7 done maintenance to treat addicted females even though they
8 are pregnant. 21 C.F.R. 130.44(6) (c), 37 Fed. Reg. No. 242,
9 p. 26798 (December 15, 1972). In addition, federal law (42
10 U.S.C.A. §242a(a)) and regulations (42 C.F.R. 52.1) prohibit
11 the disclosure of the identity of any patient in a methadone
12 treatment program. If Penal Code §273a is interpreted to
13 forbid the ingestion by pregnant women of all drugs which
14 produce withdrawal effects in infants, such an interpretation
15 would include methadone, and if Penal Code §11161.5 is inter-
16 preted to require that addicted mothers be reported, both
17 statutes would collide with federal law. The supremacy of
18 federal law would render these Penal Code provisions invalid
19 under the doctrine of pre-emption.
20 As recently applied in Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,
21 411 U.S. 624, 633, 93 S. Ct. 1854 (1973), the "pervasive
22 nature of the scheme of federal regulation" can lead to the
23 conclusion that there is pre-emption. It is submitted that
24 the pervasive nature of federal regulation of methadone treat-
25 ment has resulted in such pre-emption. Moreover, at least
26 with respect to the federal confidentiality regulations, it is
27 specifically provided that "No state law, however, may either
28 authorize or compel any disclosure prohibited by this part."
29
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1 42 C.F.R. S2.23. Cf. People v. Newman, 32 N.Y. 2d 379, 345
2 H.Y.S. 2d 502 (1973).
3
4 VII. CONCLUSION
5 This case presents a tragic example of the plight
6 facing the pregnant addict and her children today. The goal
7 of encouraging the pregnant addict to seek medical treatment
8 for herself and her child is a laudable one. That goal will
9 be stymied by a holding that the ingestion of addicting drugs
10 during pregnancy or failure to seek prenatal medical care is
11 criminal child abuse.
12
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